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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 21 st, 2008, President George W. Bush vetoed the 2007 Farm Bill
claiming that it "continues subsidies for the wealthy" and is inconsistent with
the United States (U.S.) "objectives in international trade negotiations."'
Among other things, the 2007 Farm Bill reduced the tax credit for ethanol from
fifty-one cents per gallon to forty-five cents and maintained the fifty-four cents
per gallon tariff on imported ethanol.' The House and Senate responded to the
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penumbra of wisdom and dignity still descends over his personality and guides him in all endeavors. He also
wants to thank his family and friends for their emotional support and constructive disagreements on this
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Felipe Esteves.
I. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the "Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008," 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 737 (May 21, 2008).
2. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, §§ 15331-15333, 122 Stat.
923, 1516 (2008). Author's note: 2007 Farm Bill is the enacted Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008.
See also U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n [ITC], Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2008)
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veto at once and overruled it, passing the bill into law on May 22, 2008.' The
maintenance of the subsidies and tariff on ethanol caused both domestic and
international disagreements on the hot topic of renewable fuels.
Domestically, proponents of the subsidies and tariff, led by Senator
Charles Grassley (R-IA), believe that a lift would effectively be tantamount to
a U.S. subsidy of Brazilian ethanol,4 since a U.S. importer of ethanol can
receive the forty-five cent tax credit regardless of the ethanol origin.5 In
addition, proponents believe that the tariff and subsidies are necessary to
protect the U.S. ethanol industry against cheaper foreign ethanol.6 Finally, they
contend that such measures are needed to ensure the future of U.S. energy
independency and to eventually reduce dependency on foreign oil.7
Opponents, including Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Senators
Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Richard Lugar (R-Ind), defend a lift on the tariff
to promptly foster cheaper ethanol in the U.S. market, relieve the upward
pressure on food prices, and more rapidly diminish the United States'
dependence on imported oil.8 Additionally, "the Bush Administration [opposes
the tariff extension] on the grounds that it adds a tax provision to [the] [F]arm
[B]ill." 9
The international community appears to side with the domestic opponents
to the U.S. subsidies and tariff on ethanol. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) reported that tariffs are detrimental because they "distort trade
patterns.""l Such protectionism measures, the IMF says, served to increase the
U.S. corn-based ethanol production, which represented "seventy-five percent
Supplement 1, (2008), XXI199-1-3, Subheading 99001.00.50, available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/
hts/bychapter/0810htsa.pdf (last visited July 10, 2008); Steve Hargreaves, Gasoline: Shaving offone Tax at
a Time, CNN, June 11, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/1 1/news/economy/ethanol_ tariff/index.htm?
postversion=2008061104 (last visited July 3, 2008).
3. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2.
4. Jim Lane, Brazilian President: "The developed world imports oil with no tariffs, yet theyplace
an absurd tariff on Brazilian ethanol," BIOFUEL DIGEST, April 28, 2008,
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/04/page/4/(last visited July 7, 2008); Letter from Chuck Grassley,
U.S. Senator, to George W. Bush, U.S. President (May 12, 2006) [hereinafter Letter from Chuck Grassley],
http'//grassley.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease id=bd967 Id5-
e37f-471f-bbac-b35bbbade586 (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
5. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2, § 15331; Letter from Chuck
Grassley, supra note 4.
6. See Letter from Chuck Grassley, supra note 4.
7. See id.; Lane, supra note 4.
8. See Lane, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Food and Fuel Prices-Recent Developments, Macroeconomic
Impact, and Policy Responses, 38 (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2008/063008.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
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of corn consumption between 2006 and 2007," and elevated corn prices as well
as poultry and meat prices indirectly through higher feedstock costs." The
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has reported that
protectionist instruments like subsidies and tariffs have introduced market
distortions, favoring inefficient technologies, obstructing international trade,
and impeding developing countries efforts to build upon their competitive
advantages.12
Brazil, a major exporter of ethanol, has fiercely opposed United States'
subsidies and tariff. The South American country claims that its sugar-cane-
based ethanol should be freely traded in the United States' market because it is
cheaper, "greener," and does not pose upward pressure on food prices. 3
Following the recent successful challenge in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) against some U.S. farm subsidy programs, Brazil may pursue a direct
challenge against the Unites States' protective policies on ethanol. As a more
diplomatic alternative, Brazil is pressing to include the ethanol issue in the
Doha Round of international trade negotiations, but is facing opposition from
the United States. 4
In an attempt to better comprehend the biofuel, Part II will provide a
contemporaneous perspective of ethanol and its peculiarities on the
international arena. Part 1I will follow with an economic perspective on the
imposition of tariffs. Part IV will analyze the potential illegality of the U.S.
subsidies on ethanol in light of the most recent WTO decision on U.S.
agricultural subsidies in United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton. Part V
will propose the inclusion of ethanol in the current Doha Round of international
trade negotiations agenda as an appropriate forum to discuss the issue.
Nevertheless, Part VI will conclude that the U.S. tariff and subsidies should be
lifted.
11. See id. 7.
12. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Bioenergy, FoodSecurity andSustainability-Toward
an International Framework, 10, U.N. Doc. HLC/08/INF/3 (June 3-5, 2008) [hereinafter FAO Report],
available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/userupload/foodclimate/ HLCdocs/ HLC08-inf-3-E.pdf (last
visited Oct. 7, 2008).
13. See Yahoo Brazil, Lula Proposes a "Global Pact" Over Biofuels and Says that Kyoto has
Failed, ETHANOL BRASIL, May 27, 2008 [hereinafter Yahoo Brazil],
http://ethanolbrasil.blogspot.com/2008/05/lula-prope-pacto-global-sobre.html (translated by author) (last
visited July 1, 2008); BBC Brasil, Lula Blames Petroleum Lobby for Anti-Ethanol Speeches, ETHANOL
BRASIL, June 3,2008 [hereinafter BBC Brasil], http://ethanolbrasil.blogspot.com/2008/06/lula-culpa-lobby-
de-petrleo-por.html (translated by author) (last visited July 16, 2008).
14. Jim Lane, Brazil Complaint to World Trade Organization Over US Ethanol TariffMore Likely,
BIOFUEL DIGEST, May 12,2008, http-lbiofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/05/12/brazil-complaint-to-world-trade-
organization-over-us-ethanol-tariff-more-likely/ (last visited on Sept. 26, 2008).
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II. ETHANOL AS A PROMISING TYPE OF BIOFUEL
Biofuels are defined as "fuels produced directly or indirectly from (non-
fossil material of biological origin)."' 5 Ethanol and biodiesel are the current
predominant types of biofuels in the world. 6 Today, in energy terms, ethanol
accounts for almost ninety percent of the world use of biofuel, making the
words biofuel and ethanol interchangeable. 7
Ethanol is a "clean-burning, high-octane motor fuel that is produced from
renewable sources."' 8 Presently, ethanol is made mainly from corn or sugar-
cane; yet any non-fossil material of biological origin rich in sugar can be
converted into ethanol.' 9 Although ethanol can be used as an alternative fuel,
it is most commonly used as an additive to petroleum-based fuel, with varying
possible blend standards.2"
Because of its clean-burning and non-fossil renewable source
characteristics, ethanol has been regarded as a prospective environmental
friendly substitute for petroleum-based fuel. Additionally, ethanol appears
promising as an economically viable alternative to the soaring prices of oil.
However, the popularity of ethanol is far from unanimous. There is a growing
international recognition that an increase in liquid biofuel production may exert
upward pressure on the price of commodities, leading to higher food prices.21
In addition, critics question the ability of ethanol to "mitigate climate change
effectively," and point to the negative impact on the natural ecosystem. 22
15. FAO Report, supra note 12, at 1.
16. See id. 3.
17. Id. 6.
18. American Coal. for Ethanol, Ethanol 101 [hereinafter Ethanol 101],
http://www.ethanol.org/index.php?id=34&parentid=8 (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
19. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030, 57,
DOE/EIA-0383 (2007) [hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007], http://www.eiadoe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo07/
pdf/0383(2007).pdf (last visited June 24,2008). "Ethanol can be produced from any feedstock that contains
plentiful natural sugars or starch that can be readily converted to sugar. Popular feedstocks include sugar
cane (Brazil), sugar beets (Europe), and maize/corn (United States)." Id.
20. Ethanol 101, supra note 18.
21. See FACTBOX-Biofuels: Cases for the Defense and Prosecution, REUTERS, June 3, 2008
[hereinafterFA CTBOX], available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL03 674169 (last visited
July 2, 2008).
22. LORENZO COTULA ET AL., FUELLING EXCLUSION? THE BIOFUELS BOOM AND POOR PEOPLE'S
ACCESS TO LAND 6 (2008), http./www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/1255 I1ED.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
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A. Pros of Ethanol
The promised benefits of ethanol, although varying depending upon the
source of production, are generally associated with its environmental-friendly
cleaner emission profile and attractive economic advantage over petroleum.
For instance, a study concluded that ethanol may reduce the total greenhouse
gas emissions by up to eighty-seven percent.23 In addition, studies have pointed
that ethanol on balance greatly reduces carbon dioxide emissions if compared
to petroleum-based fuel.24 The Brazilian President pointed out that the use of
ethanol has reduced carbon dioxide emissions by 800 million tons in Brazil.25
In light of the great concern with global warming and the obligation of
signatories to the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such
environmental advantages have served to expedite the creation of governmental
incentives and directives to the production and use of ethanol within their
territories."
In addition to the environmental advantages, the use of ethanol appears to
offer an economically viable alternative to the current record-high prices of
petroleum. In 2007, the average price of crude oil has remained above seventy
dollars per barrel, and is expected to average $127 per barrel in 2008.27
Specialists believe that the Brazilian sugar-cane based ethanol will remain
economically viable if crude oil remains above thirty-five to forty dollars per
barrel.28 As for corn-based ethanol, which is the main source of ethanol in the
United States, the break-even point is approximately fifty dollars per barrel.29
Additionally, technological advances in fuel efficiencies for ethanol-based
engines are expected to occur with the current increase in ethanol use, making
ethanol economically viable at even lower crude oil prices.
23. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ETHANOL: THE COMPLETE ENERGY LIFECYCLE PIcTURE 2 (2007),
available at http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/TA/345.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
24. W. Michael Griffin & Lester B. Lave, Cellulosic Ethanol in an Oil and Carbon Constrained
World, in DAVID W. MONSMA, A HIGH GROWTH STRATEGY FOR ETHANOL 21, 25 (2006).
25. Yahoo Brazil, supra note 13.
26. See Enrique Rene de Vera, Development, The WTO andBiofuels: The Possibility of Unilateral
Sustainability Requirements, 8 CHI. J. INT'L 661, 666 ( 2008) [hereinafter Development, The WTO and
Biofuels]. The Development argues that the projected increase in international trade for biofuels will be
triggered, among other things, by government mandates compelling the use of biofuels. Id.
27. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK, (2008),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/jul08.pdf (last visited July 9, 2008).
28. Development, The WTO and Biofuels, supra note 26, at 664.
29. Id.
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B. Cons of Ethanol
There exists a growing concern in the world that though the increase in
production of biofuels offers new opportunities to the world energy challenge,
it also carries risks. The world leaders, the media, and the general public have
voiced concerns with the role of biofuels in soaring food prices, its true ability
to mitigate climate change, and its negative impact on the environment. In early
June of 2008, the FAO hosted a summit on world food security, climate change,
and bioenergy.3° The main question to answer was whether the increase in
biofuel production was among the villains of hiking food prices.3
The summit culminated in a report that recognized the increase in biofuel
production as a significant factor for the rise in commodity prices, but failed to
offer concrete measures to mitigate the crisis.32 The report pointed that the
price for corn, the main United States source for making ethanol, has doubled
in 2007 and that competition for arable land has exerted upward pressure on the
price for other commodities.33 In accordance, the Energy Information
Association (EIA) stated that the increasing demand for biofuel feedstock is
likely to increase the prices for corn commodities within the short term.34 Both
reports, however, did not provide a correlation between the Brazilian sugar-
cane consumption for ethanol production and the rise in food price. Yet, the
FAO acknowledges that "[t]he nexus between fuel and food is complex" and
the degree to which biofuel influences food prices "varies across countries and
may not be quantifiable with certainty."35
Another major concern with the expansion of ethanol production is its
impact on the environment. More specifically, the land-use change from regular
crops to biofuels crops may result in large emission of carbon in the atmosphere.36
For instance, when forests, a carbon-dense type of land, are converted to grow
biofuel, the conversion creates "'carbon debts' that could take decades or even
centuries to 'repay"' with the use of the biofuels. 37 Recently, critics have accused
Brazil of expanding its sugar-cane crops into the Amazonia," an event that could
30. See FAO Report, supra note 12.
31. Fabiano Klostermann, FAO: Brazil Escapes the Role of Villain, PORTAL TERRA, July 6, 2008,
1, http://odia.terra.com.br/economia/htm/cupula-fao-etanol_brasileiroescapadopapel_
de vilao_176591.asp (last visited July 12, 2008).
32. See FAO Report, supra note 12, 11.
33. Id.
34. ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 19.
35. FAO Report, supra note 12, 12.
36. Id. 27.
37. Id.
38. See Estudo do WWF defende beneficio ambiental do etanol [WWF Study Defends the
Environmental Benefits of Ethanol], BBC BRAZIL, May 27, 2008, available at
[Vol. 15:1
severely harm the Brazilian environment and run against the purpose of ethanol
use. However, the Brazilian government and independent studies have labeled
such accusations as "myths," arguing that the Amazonia is not suitable for
sugar-cane crops. Only a negligible number of sugar-cane crops touch the
Amazon territory and 99.7% of the Brazilian sugar-cane crops are at least 1.3
thousand miles away from the Amazonia. 9
Although the risks involved with the expansion of biofuel production are
legitimate, most of the studies analyze biofuel as one category, and by doing so
they do not decide on heroes and villains. Biofuels usually comprise of
fuelwood, charcoal, ethanol, biodiesel, methane, and biohydrogen." Even
though it appears, at least in energy terms, that biofuel and ethanol are
synonyms, since ethanol accounts for ninety percent of all global biofuel use,4'
it itself has significant differences. Generally speaking, around eighty percent
of the total production of ethanol is either made of corn or of sugar-cane.42
Such differences result in dissimilar impact on food prices and the environment.
Additionally, corn and sugar-cane face a different conversion method and have
a different method of cultivation.43
C. Corn v. Sugar-Cane Ethanol
According to the FAO, "[o]f all liquid biofuels, only Brazilian sugar-cane-
based ethanol has been consistently competitive during recent years .... "
Recently, the entity has exculpated Brazilian sugar-cane-based ethanol from the
possibility it was exerting upward pressure on food prices.45 In addition,
analysts believe that Brazilian sugar-cane ethanol provides the biggest reduction
in greenhouse gas emission when compared to gasoline.46 Unlike corn-based
ethanol, they say, sugar-cane is a purer source of sugar and is extensively
cultivated.47 Going by Nobel laureate chemist Paul J. Crutzen, "[m]ost crops
http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/05/080526_wwfetanol-ac.shtml (translated by
author) (last visited July 7,2008). The study concluded that the production of sugar-cane-based ethanol poses
positive effects on the environment, does not advance on Amazon's territory, and does not significantly
compete with the food production. Id.
39. BBC Brasil, supra note 13.
40. FAO Report, supra note 12, at 1.
41. Id. 6.
42. FAO Report, supra note 12, at 2.
43. James Jacobs, Ethanol From Sugar, What are the Prospects for U.S. Sugar Co-Ops? 73 RURAL
Coops. 5 (2006), http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/sepO6/content.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
44. FAO Report, supra note 12, 10.
45. See Klostermann, supra note 3 1.
46. FACTBOX, supra note 21.
47. Id.
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grown in the [United States] and Europe to make 'green' transport fuels
actually speed up global warming" '48 because of their peculiar fertilizer use,
which emits powerful greenhouse gas."'
In addition, the estimated cost of Brazilian sugar-cane-based ethanol is
$0.81 per gallon, while the U.S. corn-based ethanol runs around $1.03 per
gallon.50 What contributes to this competitive advantage is the subtropical
location of Brazil. Generally, subtropical locations offer longer farming
seasons and lower labor costs. Additionally, corn-based ethanol uses more
energy in the conversion process, mainly because of the extra energy used to
extract sugar for distillation from the grain."'
These differences in the degree of safety and efficient production based on
the raw material of ethanol have contributed to an increase in the likelihood of
growth in international trade. The comparative advantages of subtropical
countries in ethanol production have resulted in the growth of investments,
especially in developing countries.5 2 Nevertheless, developed countries, like
the United States, are determined to secure a pivotal position in ethanol's
international landscape and to significantly increase the production and
consumption of the fuel.
D. Ethanol International Landscape
Today, the United States and Brazil are the main producers of ethanol in
the world; together they comprise about eighty-eight percent of the global
production.5 3 In 2007, the United States was responsible for fifty percent of the
world ethanol production, followed by Brazil with thirty-eight percent and the
European Union (EU) with four percent.54 Although biofuel international trade
represents only ten percent of the world supply," (with Brazil being
48. Emma Graham-Harrison, Many Biofuels Have More Climate Impact Than Oil, REUTERS, Sep.
28, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL27451808 (last visited July 12,
2008).
49. FACTBOX, supra note 21.
50. U.S. DEP'TOF AGRICULTURE [USDA], THE ECONOMIC FEASIBILrrY OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION
FROM SUGAR IN THE UNITED STATES 26, tbl. 25 (2006).
51. Jacobs, supra note 43.
52. See Development, The WTO and Biofuels, supra note 26, at 666.
53. Renewable Fuels Association, 2007 World Fuel Ethanol Production,
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#E (last visited July 7, 2008). Total 2007 world ethanol
production was 13,101.7 millions of gallons. The US produced 6498.6 millions of gallons and Brazil
produced 5019.2. Id.
54. Id. The EU produced 570.3 millions of gallons in 2007. Id.
55. FAO Report, supra note 12, 6.
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responsible for five percent), the international demand is likely to increase due
to countries meeting environmental obligations and record-high oil prices. 6
In a rather conservative growth estimate, the International Energy Agency
(IEA) projects the world road-transport fuel demand to increase from its current
1-2 percent to 3.3 percent by 2015 and 5.9 percent by 2030."7 The EU has
already issued the mandate directing its Member states to have 5.75 percent of
their total transportation fuel comprised ofbiofuel by 2010.58 Japan has already
passed a law requiring a three percent addition of ethanol to the gasoline in its
transportation fuels, representing a demand of 1.8 billion liters of ethanol, 59 and
requiring this addition to reach ten percent by 2010.60 In Sweden, the second
largest consumer of ethanol in Europe, the number of vehicles capable of
running on E85 6 fuels has doubled and the government is now working on the
bill that would prohibit the use of vehicles moved only by fossil-fuel by 2015.62
The United States government strived for 7.5 billion gallons of biofuel
consumption by 2012.63 In 2007, the United States imported only seven percent
of ethanol to fulfill the domestic demand.' To keep on supplying its growing
internal market and to become a major independent exporter of biofuel, the
United States passed the Energy and Independency Security Act of 2007 that
calls for production of thirteen billion gallons of biofuel by 2010, double the
2007 supply, and eventually thirty-six billion gallons by 2022.65 In order to
secure its ambitious goals of becoming an independent major player in the
biofuel world scenery, the United States has adopted protectionist measures in
56. See id 8; Development, The WTO and Biofuels, supra note 26, at 665.
57. FAO Report, supra note 12, 8.
58. Council and Parliament Directive 2003/30/EC, art. 3(l)(b)(ii), 2003 O.J. (L 123/45).
59. MS Noticias, Japdo serd grande cliente do etanol do Brasil, diz deputado [Japan will be a
Major Client of Brazil's Ethanol, says Congressman], ETHANOL BRASIL, May 28, 2008, available at
http://ethanolbrasil.blogspot.com/2008/05/japo-ser-grande-cliente-do-etanol-do.html (translated by author)
(last visited July 5, 2008).
60. Hisane Masaki, Japan's Biofuel Drive Faces a Bumpy Road, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, May 11,
2007, at P2, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IEl lDhO l.htmi (last visited Julyl, 2008).
61. About.com, Definition: E85, http://saveenergy.about.con/od/fuelingyourautomobile/
g/E85.htm, (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
62. Gazeta Mercantil, Brasil dobrard exportagio de etanol para a Sudcia Gazeta [Brazil will
Double Ethanol Exports to Sweden], ETHANOL BRASIL, June 9, 2008, available at
http://ethanolbrasil.blogspot.com/2008/06/gazeta-brasil-dobrar-exportao-de-etanol.html (translated by
author) (last visited July 3, 2008).
63. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501(2)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 594, 1069 (2005).
64. Renewable Fuels Association, U.S. Fuel Ethanol Demand, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/
industry/statistics/#E (last visited July 3, 2008). The U.S. produced 6,500 million gallons of ethanol and
imported 450 million gallons of the fuel. Id.
65. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202(2)(B)(i)(1, 121
Stat. 1492, 1522 (2007).
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the form of subsidies and tariffs that have introduced market distortions,
maintained inefficient technologies, and hindered international trade.66
Furthermore, such measures are likely to run afoul with international trade
agreements.
HI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TARIFF ON ETHANOL
The 2007 Farm Bill, inter alia, extended the tariff on imported ethanol
maintained subsidies to domestic ethanol producers. 7 The law extended the
fifty-four cents per gallon tariff on imported ethanol through the end of the
calendar year 2010.68 In addition, every gallon of ethanol, whether domestic or
imported, is now entitled to a forty-five cent subsidy which is down from fifty-
one cents.69
The economic concept of free trade contends that tariffs restrict trade,
competition and fail to maximize consumer welfare as domestic prices are
artificially prevented from falling.70 On the other side of the spectrum,
protectionists advocate imposition of tariffs claiming that it helps protect newly
founded industries by giving them time to grow and become competitive in the
international economy.7' In the United States, the great majority of economists
appear to favor free trade policies.72
A 2006 survey on American economists revealed that over eighty-seven
percent "[a]gree that the United States should eliminate remaining tariffs and
other barriers to trade., 73 The domestic effects in a tariff-imposing country are
higher prices for the protected commodity and shift of comparative advantage
resources.74 The higher prices are a direct shortcoming of the tariff because it
artificially raises the price of imports. 75  A higher price for the imported
commodity would shift the consumption to other domestic substitutes76 -in this
case the U.S. corn-based ethanol. This would draw more resources to the
production of the corn-based ethanol, which is presumably ranked lower in the
66. See FAO Report, supra note 12, 10.
67. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2.
68. Hargreves, supra note 2; Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2.
69. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2, § 15331.
70. See MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 93,99 (Dryden
Press, 8th ed. 1998) (1971).
71. See id. at 85, 108.
72. See Robert Whaples, Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!, 3 THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1
(2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/artl/(last visited July 3, 2005).
73. Id.
74. KREININ, supra note 70, at 93.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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order of comparative advantage to imported ethanol (otherwise the tariff would
not be necessary) and result in a loss in efficiency for the economy as a whole."
In addition, tariffs result in lower real income in the world as a whole
because the volume of trade is lower than it would have been under free-trade
conditions.78 "The exporting nations lose because of both the reduction in the
volume of trade and the deterioration in the terms of trade."79 The importing
nation, however, would only lose if the reduction in volume trade were lower
than any gain due to the improvement in the terms in which it trades.8° Yet,
even if the importing nation receives net gains in real income due to the tariff
imposition, the real income of the world as a whole is invariably reduced.8'
Proponents of protectionist tariffs rest their claim on several arguments,
namely the so-called infant-industry argument, improvement of trade, and
increase in employment.82 The infant-industry argument asserts that newly
established large-scale domestic industry should be protected with the
imposition of protective tariffs in order for it to grow to optimum size, and to
be competitive in the international market.83 This argument is valid only if
there is a serious threat of "market failure" absent the government protection,
otherwise the industry could develop under free-market conditions with private
funds instead (presuming that the industry will eventually become
competitive). 84 In addition, the argument is for a "temporary protection."85
Finally, the theory is complex to apply in practice because of the difficulty in
accurately ascertaining when an industry reaches its optimum point and the
intrinsic difficulty of lifting a tariff once it has been imposed, all leading to
periods of inefficiencies..86
Other proponents of tariffs argue that they can increase real income in the
tariff-imposing nation. 87 This argument, however, only applies to large players
in the international market and "assumes that other countries would not
retaliate., 88 "Tariffs may also be used to increase employment. ,89 However,
77. See id.
78. Id. at 97.
79. KREININ, supra note 70, at 97.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 108.
83. Id.
84. KREINN, supra note 70, at 108.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. KREININ, supra note 70, at 108.
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fiscal, monetary, or exchange-rate policies are considered more effective and
efficient measures to tackle unemployment.9
In sum, the U.S. tariff on imported ethanol does not make economic sense
unless it is proven that the corn-based ethanol industry would definitely fail if
the tariff was lifted and the tariff is only a temporary measure. Nonetheless,
with the increased recognition that import protection is generally harmful,
several developed and developing countries have created a multilateral forum
to foster free trade among nations. The forum is called the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
IV. THE WTO AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
Since its inception in 1995, the WTO has contributed tremendously to the
development of global trade.9' Substituting the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the WTO was intended to crystallize the international
desire for free, predictable, and smooth trade among nations.92 In order to
ensure a more secure and predictable trading system, the WTO formalized a
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is responsible for the duties previously
undertaken by the GATT General Council and aims at providing a rules-based
system under which countries resolve their trade issues according to the
international agreements.93
The DSB consists of all WTO members, but delegates its review power to
Panels and the Appellate Body when a dispute is formally established.94 The
dispute settlement mechanism prioritizes settlement by mandating a
consultation period among the parties before a Panel can be established.95 If
consultation is unsuccessful, the complaining party can request a Panel
decision.96 During the panel stage, the parties would present their case and
stipulate the facts before the panelists. 97 Unless there is a consensus among all
WTO members against the Panel's final decision, the Panel report becomes
90. Id. at 108-09.
91. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [WTO], THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ... IN BRIEF, 2007
[hereinafter WTO IN BRIEF], available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/doload_e/inbr-e.pdf(last visited
July 3, 2008).
92. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION [WTO], THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION... IN BRIEF: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM-PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, 2007,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbriefe/inbr01_e.htm (last visited July 3, 2008).
93. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, 2007 [hereinafter WTO Settling
Disputes], http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/displ e.htm (last visited July 7, 2008).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id
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final.98 Each party can appeal the Panel's decision on questions of law.99 The
Appellate Body can "uphold, modify, or reverse" the original Panel's
decision.' Following the final decision, the losing party can either comply
with the Panel ruling or defy the WTO and face sanctions from the winning
party and the third parties involved.' '
The formalization of a dispute system mechanism among WTO members
has also served to give developing countries a voice in the international trade
arena. Despite the sour cost of these types of litigations, the number of
developing countries raising legal actions at the WTO has increased
dramatically since its inception in 1995.102 Between 1995 and 2001, about one-
third of WTO disputes involved developing countries as complainants.'0° In the
span of 2005 to 2007, close to half of the WTO disputes were initiated by
developing countries. '
Brazil has been the most active developing country complainant in the
WTO dispute resolution system.'15 The South American country is renowned
in the international arena for its constant attacks on developed countries'
agricultural subsidies and protectionist tariffs. Brazil argues that developed
countries, by granting enormous agricultural subsidies and placing high tariffs
on certain imports, artificially distort the world price for the commodities and
consequently harm developing countries' opportunity to prosper in international
trade.
Recently, an Appellate Body affirmed a major Panel decision ruling for
Brazil against the U.S. cotton subsidy program.0 6 Because other U.S. crops,
such as corn, soybeans, and rice, are subsidized under the same legislation as
cotton, parallel arguments can be made to tumble the U.S. subsidies for each of
98. WTO Settling Disputes, supra note 93.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. HAIDER A. KHAN & YIBEI Liu, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM: MAKING A RULES-BASED TRADING REGIME WORK 21 (2008), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/7613/l/MPRAJpaper_7613.pdf (last visited July 5, 2008).
103. See id.
104. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Find dispute cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispue/find dispu cases-e (last visited October 23, 2008) (choose year 2005, 2006, 2007; under member,
select "as complainant"). A total of 45 disputes were raised in this span--with twenty by developing
countries.
105. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Disputes by country, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispu_e/dispubycountrye.htm (last visited October 22,2008). As of October 2008,408
disputes were initiated in the DSB and Brazil alone have filed 23 complaints.
106. Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates-Subsidies on UplandCotton [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report], IN 447-49, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008).
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these sectors. With an eye on the corn sector, the raw material for the U.S.
ethanol, Brazil along with Canada and several other third-party complainants
have already challenged other U.S. government farm supporting programs in the
WTO.' °7 Although claims against other U.S. farm programs may be more
difficult to prove due to the possible smaller impact of corn and soybean in
world prices," 8 the "conviction" of the U.S. cotton subsidy programs will most
likely serve as a key precedent for the complainant's challenge.
A. The Creation of a Precedent on Agriculture Subsidies
In UnitedStates-Subsidies on Upland Cotton (Cotton), Brazil alleged that
several U.S. farm programs tailored to the cotton sector violated the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the Agreement on
Agriculture (AA). 9 Brazil alleged, among others arguments, that the U.S.
subsidies for the cotton sector were responsible for the artificial cotton price
suppression in the global market, and hence, the U.S. program violated Articles
5 and 6.3 of the ASCM."' Brazil challenged the U.S. programs under two farm
bills".1 including the marketing loan payments, user-marketing (Step-2)
payments, marketing loss assistance payments (MLA), and counter-cyclical
payments (CCP).1 2 A brief explanation of these programs is warranted.
The marketing loan program provides interim financing to eligible
producers to prevent forfeiture on farm loans." 3 The interim loan effectively
serves to enable farmers to store their harvest crops as collateral instead of
selling at harvest time when crop prices are lower, and sell it when prices are
more favorable to repay the loan."' The repayment is the "[1]ower of the
adjusted world market price and the loan rate plus interest.""' 5 "When the
107. See Acceptance by the United States of the Request to Join Consultations, United
States-Domestic Support andExport Credit Guarantees forAgricultural Products, WT/DS365/12 (Aug. 21,
2007). The delegation of the United States informed the DSB that it had accepted the requests of Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, the European Communities, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Thailand, and Uruguay to join the
consultation. Id.
108. Chad E. Hart, Agricultural Situation Spotlight: How the Brazil-US. Cotton Dispute Could
Affect Iowa's Agriculture, 10 IOWA AGRIC. REV. 7 (2004), available at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/iowa agreview/sumner_04/IAR.pdf (last visited July 5, 2008).
109. Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 3.1-3.2, WT/DS267/R (Sep. 8,
2004) [hereinafter Cotton].
110. Id. 3.1(vii).
111. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat.
888 (2006); Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).
112. See Cotton, supra note 109, 3.1.
113. Id. 7.204.
114. Id.
115. Id. 7.207.
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adjusted world market price is lower than the loan rate, the producer repays at
less than the loan rate and the difference is referred to as a 'marketing loan
gain.'""16 Thus, the marketing loan program effectively compensates producers
for a low world market price for their specific commodity.
The Step-2 program rewarded eligible domestic users and exporters of
eligible cotton with marketing certificates or cash payments when certain
market conditions existed.'17 In this case, if the U.S. cotton price exceeded the
world cotton price, U.S. buyers were refunded the extra cost of buying the
domestic cotton."' Thus, the Step-2 effectively served to diminish the demand
of imported cotton into the United States.
The MLA was a program designed to provide supplementary assistance to
producers in order to make up for losses sustained because of the low
commodity prices." 9 The MLA payments were intended to supplement funds
distributed in other programs. 12 The payments were made proportionally to
previous payments from other farm programs.' 2'
Finally, the CCP provided financial support to farmers based on historical
acreage of cotton planted in the past, notwithstanding what the farmer currently
grows.122 The distribution of funds depended upon the current prices of com-
modities.12 1 Whenever the effective price of cotton fell below the target price,
fixed at 72.4 cents per pound, the CCP payments reached the producers. 124 In
short, the CCP program ensured producers a floor price for their cotton
regardless of the natural fluctuation of market prices.
The Panel decided that all of the above U.S. programs were subsidies
within the definition of ASCM Articles 1 and 2.125 In addition, the Panel ruled
that these subsidies caused "serious prejudice" to Brazil, and hence violated
Article 6.3 of the ASCM.126 Following a United States appeal, the Appellate
Body affirmed the "serious prejudice" claim as to all challenged U.S. farm
programs mentioned above.'27
116. Id.
117. Cotton, supra note 109, 7.209.
118. Id. 7.210.
119. Id. 7.216.
120. Id. 7.217.
121. Id.
122. Cotton, supra note 109, 7.223.
123. Id. 7.225.
124. Id.
125. Id. IN 7.1154-55.
126. Id. 8.1(g)(i).
127. Appellate Body Report, supra note 106, 6.
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Besides giving the claimants an important victory over the U.S. subsidies
on upland cotton, this decision set out a key precedent for future litigations. In
Cotton, the Panel provided a clear framework for a nation to prevail on a
"serious prejudice" claim. Last year, in United States- Domestic Support and
Export Credit GuaranteesforAgricultural Products, 2 ' (Agricultural Subsidies)
Brazil challenged the United States on other farm programs existent under the
same legislation challenged in Cotton. Although Brazil has not directly
challenged the U.S. ethanol subsidy program, such a challenge may be possible
since the Harmonized System of TariffClassification129 classifies ethanol as an
agricultural product.1 30 This means that the discipline on subsidies set forward
in the AA and ASCM would apply to U.S. ethanol. Hence, an analysis of the
framework set out in Cotton may shed light on possible arguments and results
in an eventual direct challenge against the U.S. ethanol subsidy program.
B. The Framework and Application
For a nation to prevail on a "serious prejudice" claim in a WTO dispute,
the Panel must first find that the challenged measures or programs meet the
subsidy definition of Article 1 and 2 of the ASCM.' 3' Later, the Panel must
conclude that those subsidies caused "serious prejudice to the interest of
another Member," in accordance with ASCM Article 6.3.132 If it is found that
the claimant party suffered "serious prejudice," then the Panel will rule that the
respondent violated Article 5 of the ASCM and finalize the claim.
Article 1 of the ASCM defines subsidy as a "financial contribution by a
government... within the territory of a Member" that confers a "benefit."' 33
The contributions can be in the form of direct payments, such as grants and
loans, forgone or not collected government revenue, such as tax credits, or
"goods or services other than general infrastructure .... 134 In Cotton, the
128. Request for the Establishment ofa Panel by Brazil, UnitedStates-Domestic Support andExport
Credit Guarantees for Agricultural Products, WT/DS365/13 (Nov. 9, 2007).
129. FAO Report, supra note 12, at 11.
130. Id.
131. Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 33 I.L.M. 229, 229-30 (1994) [hereinafter ASCM Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/24-scm.pdf (last visited June 20, 2008). Article I defines
subsidies and Article 2 defines the specificity required for the subsidy to be actionable.
132. Id. at 233 ("No member should cause through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs
I and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.:... serious prejudice to the interest
of another Member.").
133. Id. at229.
134. Id.
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Panel reasoned that the marketing loan program, Step-2, MLA, and CCP were
governmental financial contributions that conferred a benefit because they
placed "[t]he recipient in a better position that the recipient otherwise would
have been in the market place."' 35 The Panel further noted that there is no need
to quantify the amount of financial benefit conferred, but simply show it
exists.' 36
In a challenge against the U.S. ethanol subsidy program, it is plausible to
believe that the Panel will find that the U.S. forty-five cents tax credit per
gallon of ethanol is a subsidy in accordance with Article 1 of the ASCM. First,
it is important to remember that ethanol is treated as an agricultural product,
and hence it is subject to the ASCM.'3 7 Second, the ethanol tax credit is a
government financial contribution in the form of "forgone or not collected"
revenue. 3' Finally, it is arguable that the recipients of the financial
contribution are conferred a benefit, because they are placed in a better position
than they otherwise would have been in the market place. Nevertheless, the
United States may claim that the tax credit is applied to any gallon of ethanol,
be it domestic or imported; therefore, it is also being indirectly distributed to
businesses outside the United States. 3 9 However, as Article 1 requires that the
financial contribution is made "within the territory of a Member,"' 4° it is likely
that the U.S. tax credit on ethanol would qualify as a subsidy, regardless of its
provenance, since it is being awarded within the United States only.
Article 2 of the ASCM requires the subsidy to be "[s]pecific to an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries ... within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority" in order to be actionable.' 4 ' The Article
also lists several principles to follow in order to determine whether the subsidy
is "specific."' 42  In Cotton, Brazil successfully argued that because the
challenged measures were not widely available throughout the United States,
some were not even available to the agricultural sector, and the subsidies were
specific within the meaning of Article 2. "' The United States consented to this
135. Cotton, supra note 109, 7.1118-20.
136. Seeid. 7.1119.
137. FAO Report, supra note 12, at 11.
138. See ASCM Agreement, supra note 131, at art. 1.l(a)(1)(ii) (subsidies are defined as, among
others, "government revenue that is otherwise due [but] is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives
such as tax credits)").
139. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2, § 15331 (stating in effect that
the tax credit for ethanol applies to domestic and imported ethanol).
140. ASCM Agreement, supra note 131, at 229.
141. Id.atart.2.1,230.
142. Id. at art. 2.1(a)-(c), 230.
143. Cotton, supra note 109, 7.1122, 7.1151.
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argument, except for the MLA program, which the United States alleged is
available to the entire agricultural sector.'" The Panel discarded the U.S.
argument saying that the term "specific," as other plain words of Article 2, "[i]s
a general concept and the breadth or narrowness of specificity is not susceptible
to rigid quantitative definition."'45 The Cotton Panel finally concluded that all
challenged U.S. subsidies met the specificity requirement.'46
Based upon the WTO's broad interpretation of the term "specific" in
Article 2 of the ASCM, the United States' tax credit program for ethanol is
likely to be deemed a specific subsidy. The forty-five cents tax credit is set to
apply for gallons of ethanol produced in or imported to the United States. 147
This effectively makes the legislation valid to a specific enterprise, namely
producers and users of ethanol within the U.S. territory. Considering Cotton,
it seems plausible to believe that the United States will not contest a possible
specificity allegation.
Article 6.3 of the ASCM provides four scenarios in which "serious
prejudice" may arise. 48 Precisely, Article 6.3(a) prescribes that serious
prejudice occurs when "[t]he effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing
member."' 149 Even though the Cotton Panel did not tackle Article 6.3(a) to reach
its conclusion, the Panel in Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry (Autos) shed some light in the interpretation of key
concepts of the Article. 5 ° The Panel in Autos explored the meaning of
"displacement" and "impedance" and considered that "[a] complainant [is not
required to] demonstrate a decline in sales in order to demonstrate displacement
or impedance .... Displacement relates to a situation where sales volume has
declined, while impedance relates to a situation where sales which otherwise
would have occurred were impeded."'' Therefore, the issue is whether market
share and sales data of the specific product provide a view that, but for the
respondents' subsidies the sales of the claimant's product, would have been
greater than they were.'52
144. Id. 7.1125-1126.
145. Id. 7.1142.
146. Id 7.1154.
147. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, supra note 2, § 15331.
148. ASCM Agreement, supra note 131, at art. 6.3, 234.
149. Id. at art. 6.3(a), 234.
150. Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 14.218,
WT/DS59/R (July 2, 1998).
151. Id.
152. See id.
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Similar to Cotton, in a direct challenge against the U.S. ethanol subsidy
program, Brazil would bear the burden of proof'53 to show a correlation
between the U.S. tax credits on ethanol and a reduction of Brazilian's ethanol
market share or sales. Usually the evidences used are complex econometric
models that demonstrate the parties' assertion. Although such models are
confidential during the dispute resolution, a simple market share analysis shows
a decrease in Brazil's market share of ethanol production in comparison with
the U.S. market share from the inception of the tax credit program. The U.S.
tax credit program for ethanol came into effect on January 1, 2005.'54 In 2004,
Brazil produced eleven percent more ethanol than the United States did.'55 In
2005, Brazil's production of ethanol vis-ii-vis the United States fell to minus
one percent. 56 In 2006, it was minus eight percent, and finally in 2007, it
reached minus twenty-three percent.'57 Additionally, Brazil was the world's
number one producer of ethanol in 2004, holding thirty-seven percent of total
production.' 58 Since 2005, the year in which the tax credit took effect, the
United States became the world leader, producing fifty percent of the world's
ethanol in 2007.15' Therefore, it appears likely that Brazil can show a
correlation between the U.S. credit tax program for ethanol and Brazil's
reduction in ethanol market share.
Furthermore, Brazil will have to prove 60 that the United States' subsidies
were the cause in fact of its lost market share. At this point, the United States
would argue that external factors, such as world demand and natural increase
in domestic consumption, and consequently production, drove the increase in
the U.S. market share. Yet, it is important to note that the Panel in Cotton
acknowledged that other factors might have affected prices of cotton in the
world market, but even so, the Panel decided that the sole causal link existed
between the U.S. subsidies and the significant world price suppression.'
16
Therefore, the United States would need to come with strong, persuasive
153. Appellate Body Report, supra note 106, 436.
154. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 6426, 118 Stat. 1418, 1463
(2008).
155. Renewable Fuels Association, Annual World Ethanol Production by Country,
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#E (last visited July 7, 2008). Brazil produced 3,989 millions
of gallons while the U.S. produced 3,535 in year 2004. Id.
156. Id. In 2005, Brazil produced 4,227 millions of gallons while the U.S. produced 4,264. Id.
157. Id. In 2006, Brazil produced 4,491 millions of gallons while the U.S. produced 4,855. In 2007,
Brazil produced 5019.2 millions of gallons while the U.S. produced 6498.6. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 106, 113.
161. See Cotton, supra 109, 7.1308-09.
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reasons to prove a weak link between the U.S. tax credit on ethanol and the
reduction of Brazil's ethanol market share.
Although this is a brief analysis of a complex claim, the assessment at least
indicates the fragility of the legality of the U.S. farm subsidies, specifically the
ethanol tax credits. In the meantime, Brazil has arduously tried to settle the
dispute pertinent to the U.S. ethanol subsidies and tariff diplomatically. 61 In
March of 2007, President George W. Bush visited Brazilian ethanol facilities
and with Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva signed a memorandum
of understanding about cooperation in the biofuel area. 163 Nevertheless, the
Presidents did not discuss, at least publicly, the subsidies and tariff related to
ethanol.' 6
The focus has turned to the so-called Doha Round of negotiations. The
developing countries criticize the developed countries for halting the Doha
Round negotiations by not letting go of the subsidies and tariffs on agriculture
products. 165 The United States, for instance, refuses to include ethanol in the
Doha Round negotiations.166 Brazil, on the other hand, finds the United States'
resistance unfair. 167  Despite the friction, the Doha Round appears to be a
promising forum to resolve the current dispute over the U.S. ethanol subsidy
and tariff in a less confronting manner.
V. DORA RoUND AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM
The WTO administers the multilateral trading system which functions to
ensure "that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible.' ' 68
"The system was developed through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds,
held under GATT.' 69 The current WTO rules and agreements are the result of
162. The Associated Press, US, EUBlock Brazilian Attempt to Slash Biofuel Tariffs at WTO, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2007, at I [hereinafter US, EU Block Brazilian Attempt to Slash Biofuel Tariffs
at WTO], available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/05/business/EU-FIN-ECO-WTO-US-
Biofuels.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
163. The President's News Conference with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil in Sao
Paulo, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 290, 290 (2007).
164. See id. at289.
165. Kiran Omar, Doha Round: Why it was Destined to Fail, ALTERNATIVES, Sept. 3, 2008, at 1,
http://www.alternatives.ca/article4053.html (last visited October 23, 2008).
166. 0 Globo Online, Brasil condiciona acordo no OMC a ganho para etanol nos EUA [Brazil
Conditions a Deal at the WTO to Obtain an Immediate Victory over Ethanol in the UnitedStates], ETHANOL
BRASIL, June 6, 2008, http://ethanolbrasil.blogspot.com/2008/06/brasil-condiciona-acordo-na-omc-
ganho.html (translated by author) (last visited July 7, 2008).
167. US, EU Block Brazilian Attempt to Slash Biofuel Tariffs at WTO, supra note 162.
168. WTOINBRIEF,supranote9l,at 1.
169. Id. at 3.
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such negotiations between Members. 7 ' Although ambassadors and heads of
delegations frequently meet to discuss the agreements, the top decisions come
from the Ministerial Conference Body, which meets at least once every two
years.
171
The current sets of rules are the outcome of the work of the 1986-1994
Ministerial Conference started in Uruguay, also called the Uruguay Round of
negotiations. 172 The Uruguay Round resulted in major revisions of the original
GATT, including the formalization of the DSB and the creation of the WTO.
73
Besides creating and improving agreements for trade in goods, the Uruguay
Round "[c]reated new rules for dealing with trade in services, relevant aspects
of intellectual property, dispute settlement, and trade policy reviews."' 174 The
final version of the decisions taken comprises over 30,000 pages consisting of
sixty agreements and separate commitments made by individual Members.'
75
The 2001 Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, set out the Doha
Round that is currently under negotiations. In its establishment, the WTO
Members committed themselves, inter alia, "[t]o [engage] [in] comprehensive
negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions
of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support."' 76 In addition, the Members
agreed "[t]o negotiate reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services."' 7 7 Based on these
goals, it seems clear that the Doha Round is an appropriate forum to resolve the
issue revolving the U.S. subsidies and tariff on ethanol. However, the United
States has blocked Brazil's attempt to slash biofuel tariff at the WTO.
71
Allowing ethanol to be part of the Doha agenda is beneficial in several
ways. First, it would unclog the already thwarted seven year round of
negotiations. The Doha Round has been marked with fierce disagreements,
mainly between developing and developed nations on agriculture subsidies.'79
Developing countries argue that they have acquiesced too much to the
developed countries' demands in the past Rounds and are unwilling to approve
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 4.
173. WTO IN BRIEF, supra note 91, at 3.
174. Id. at4.
175. Id.
176. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 13,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
177. Id. 31(iii).
178. US, EU Block Brazilian Attempt to Slash Biofuel Tariffs at WTO, supra note 162.
179. Id.
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agricultural subsidies being distributed in the developed nations.' However,
developed nations rebut this by noting that developing countries are not
properly enforcing negotiated agreements within their territory, especially those
related to intellectual property and services. 8 ' Thus, the inclusion of ethanol
in the talks, a requirement that has been fiercely pushed by Brazil,'82 could
break the current impasse by signaling the developed nations' willingness to
meet the developing countries' request. Consequently, this would motivate their
enforcement of past agreements.
Second, including the ethanol in the trade talks would be a more
diplomatic approach to deal with the subsidies and tariffs issue than having a
panel confrontation on the DSB. Having ethanol on the Doha agenda would
allow time for the ambassadors and delegates to negotiate a strategy to reduce,
and perhaps eventually eliminate, the subsidies and tariffs that impact ethanol
trade in the global arena in accordance with the spirit of the WTO. A decision
from the DSB, however, would be a guilty/non-guilty answer with possible
imposition of harsh sanctions that can contribute to a disturbing result in world
trade. Furthermore, the legal analysis of the U.S. subsidies on ethanol has
already pointed to a possible violation of the ASCM (see Part IV.B. supra).
Therefore, bringing ethanol to the table can avoid the need of a legal review and
bring it to the diplomatic spirit emphasized in the WTO.
Finally, including ethanol in the Doha Round could help re-establish the
U.S. reputation as a "free trader." The United States was among the founders
of the multilateral trading system that emphasized the need for freer trade
among nations. However, the adoption of multi-billion dollar subsidies on
agriculture and the imposition of protective tariffs serve to put into question the
legitimacy of the United States true intent in regards to the free trade aspired in
the past. It makes little sense to engage in foreign-aid programs and then
proceed to offset the aid by imposing import duties. Allowing ethanol in the
talks would show to the global community the United States' willingness to
concede to a delicate issue in a global forum of trade negotiations.
In sum, the Doha Round of negotiations is an appropriate forum for the hot
ethanol subsidies and tariffs issue. By conceding on the ethanol, the United
States would contribute to unclog the thwarted Doha Round, resolve the issue
in a diplomatic manner, and signal to the global community that the developed
180. See Is New Vista Possible for the Doha Round, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Jul. 23, 2008, at 1,
available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/6457243.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
181. Id.; William A. Lovett, Reflections on the WTODoha Ministerial: Bargaining Challenges and
Conflicting Interests: Implementing the Doha Round, 17 AM. INT'L L. REv. 951, 978-79 (2002).
182. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Brazil Presses US, EU to Include Ethanol in any WTO Trade
Pact, INT'L HERARD TRIBUNE, July 28, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/
2008/07/28/business/EU-WTO-Ethanol.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
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countries are willing to cooperate with important requests from the developing
countries in the negotiations. This would only strengthen the role of the WTO
spirit of free trade by its major founder and contributor, namely the United
States.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tariffs and subsidies symbolizing protectionist trade has long been a
constituent part of every nation's political life. However, such policies usually
benefit a powerful minority at the expense of broader public interests. In
addition, protectionist measures go against the spirit of global trading norms so
emphasized by the WTO founders, including the United States.
The Brazilian sugar-cane-based ethanol is currently cheaper, "greener,"
and less influential on the current upward pressure of food prices as compared
to the U.S. corn-based ethanol.'83 A lift in the tariff would promptly increase
the use of this more efficient biofuel in the United States, possibly leading to
an immediate reduction in the skyrocketed gas prices. In addition, it would
shift back the corn production to fulfill the demand for the commodity, which
should lead to a downward pressure in the price of corn, edible oil, poultry, and
meat. In other words, corn, as food, should be directed to food-consumption.
Sugar-cane, as a mere juicy grass, should be used for biofuel.
Classic economics shows that tariffs do not serve to maximize consumer
welfare. In support of this view, the great majority of U.S. economists believe
that the U.S. tariff on imported ethanol should be lifted. Additionally, the U.S.
subsidies on ethanol production are likely to violate international agreements
and, consequently, fail judicial scrutiny in a possible challenge at the WTO.
Furthermore, a leading nation like the United States should serve as an example
for the developed nations and keep the spirit of free trade at international
rounds of negotiations with the inclusion of ethanol in the Doha Round agenda.
In any forum, however, the conclusion about the U.S. tariff and subsidies on
ethanol appears the same: it should be lifted.
183. Yahoo Brazil, supra note 13.
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